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Chapter 3
The Case for Marking Public Plan Liabilities
to Market
Jeremy Gold and Gordon Latter

Career employees of US state and local governments such as teachers, civil
servants, police, firefighters, and sanitation workers are usually covered
by defined benefit (DB) public pension plans. The financial positions of
such pensions are typically reported in documents called Comprehensive
Annual Financial Reports (CAFRs). Public pension plan CAFRs usually
include extensive data about plan assets, cash flows, expenses, investment
policy, and performance. This information is helpful to watchdogs and
other parties interested in monitoring the financial integrity of pools of
assets that can run into hundreds of billions of dollars.
Information about public plan liabilities, however, is far more difficult to
obtain. A typical CAFR will disclose the actuarial methods and assumptions
used in the liability calculations, including plan provisions, data on participant ages, projections on salaries and service, and actuarial methods.
The measure of the actuarial liabilities is highly dependent upon the methods and assumptions chosen by the plan actuary, or contained in local
statutes and regulations. Actuarial assumptions are typically consistent with
Actuarial Standards of Practice (ASOPs), especially ASOP No. 4 and ASOP
No. 27 (for economic assumptions), and ASOP No. 35 (for demographic
assumptions). The economic assumptions (expected returns on invested
assets, future inflation, and salary increases) are designed to facilitate a
long-range budgeting process and are not intended to reflect current market conditions. The actuarial liabilities developed in accordance with these
long range projections are not well-linked to economic values and leave
several important pension financial questions unanswered.
This chapter focuses on three such questions of particular importance to
public pension plan valuation:
1) Will future taxpayers be paying for services provided to current and
previous generations of taxpayers, or might the opposite be true?
2) How can we compare the funding level and benefit security of one
public pension plan with plans in other US jurisdictions?
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3) What is the market value of benefits earned by public employees in any given year, and what does this tell us about their total
compensation?
As a preview of our arguments below, we propose that a useful approach
can be modeled after the CAFR for the New York City Employees’ Retirement System (NYCERS) for the 2007 fiscal year (New York City Employees’
Retirement System & New York City Public Employee’s Group Life Insurance Plan 2007: 149). Developed by Robert C. North, Jr., Chief Actuary of
the New York City Office of the Actuary, the report includes supplementary
information not generally available. For instance, the analysis provides several measures of plan assets and liabilities. For reasons discussed below, we
identify the Market Value of the Accumulated Benefit Obligation (MVABO)
shown in the rightmost column as the Market Value of Liabilities (MVL)
for the plan. The same report shows several measures of the plan’s funded
ratio, defined as assets divided by liabilities. We suggest that the ‘North
Ratio’ or the market value of assets (MVA) divided by the MVABO, is the
most useful measure of the plan’s financial status. This ratio helps us to
answer the three questions shown above.
The remainder of the chapter discusses the importance and relevance of
the Market Value of Liabilities. Next we examine the ordinary disclosures
of several public pension plans and make rough estimates of their MVLs.
We then consider the implications of MVL disclosure and conclude with
some thoughts for policymakers.

Market value of pension liabilities
In 2006, the Society of Actuaries and the American Academy of Actuaries
identified three defined benefit pension liability measures (Enderle et al.
2006):
1. Market liability is determined by reference to a portfolio of traded
securities that matches the benefit stream in amount, timing, and
probability of payment.
2. Solvency liability is determined by reference to a portfolio of defaultfree securities that matches the benefit stream in amount and timing.
3. Budget liability is the traditional actuarial accrued liability used to
develop a schedule of contributions to be made to the plan over time.
The budget liability depends on choices made by the plan with respect to
the actuarial funding method to be used and upon assumptions made in
accordance with ASOP. Budget liabilities are not marked to market and do
not address our three pension finance questions.
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Focusing on the other two measures, the market liability equals the solvency liability if payment is certain. In many jurisdictions, pension payments
are highly protected by the taxing power of the government sponsor and
collateralized by the plan assets. Although the main purpose of pension
funding in the private sector is to provide collateral, Peskin (2001) observes
that the primary rationale for public sector funding is to assure intergenerational equity—that is, that each generation of taxpayers pays for the
public services it consumes contemporaneously. In practice, while there
are jurisdictions in which benefits may not be perfectly secure, in what
follows we deem the MVL to be well-measured assuming that the probability
of payment is nearly certain. Robert North’s use of Treasury securities
to measure New York City’s public pension MVL is consistent with this
approach.1
The Employment Relationship and the Role of the Pension Plan. Economists distinguish principals from agents. Principals are those with ‘skin in
the game’; it is their pocketbooks that will be more or less full as a result
of the economic activity in question. Agents are those whose decisions
affect the welfare of the principals. In the public plan arena, the principals
include taxpayers, plan participants (employees, retirees, and beneficiaries), and lenders. Many agents are involved, including elected officials,
plan trustees, plan administrators and their staffs, investment officers, asset
managers, rating agencies, consultants, and actuaries.
Governments hire employees to provide services to taxpayers and other
residents. These employees are compensated by taxpayers in (at least) two
ways: current cash compensation (salaries), and promises of future cash
(pensions). To avoid either burdening or subsidizing future taxpayers,
current taxpayers should generally expect to finance the cost of today’s
services today, even if a deferred component of public employee total
compensation may not be paid out for decades.
A public pension plan is like a reservoir: it allows taxpayers to pay
today for benefits that will support retirees tomorrow. Unlike water held
in reserve, however, pension assets may be expected to earn investment
returns over time. Because of these returns and the risks associated
with them, a generationally neutral taxpayer/employee compensation system requires sophisticated financial analysis. How much is tomorrow’s
promise worth today? Who bears what risks along the way? The balance of this section answers these questions using the tools of financial
economics.
Financial Economics and Traditional Actuarial Pension Practice. Financial economists and actuaries use quantitative methods to estimate the
value today of money to be paid in the future. Although the root process,
discounted cash flow, is common to both disciplines, the analysis of risk and
who bears it can be quite different. The differences between actuarial and
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financial techniques have been discussed in the actuarial literature at least
since Bühlmann (1987).2
The actuarial process is designed to develop a budget for the inflow
of cash into the pension plan such that money will be available to meet
benefit promises as they come due. The process depends on regular budget
updates which smoothly adjust incoming cash flows to take account of
emerging demographic and financial experience. By contrast, financial
economists emphasize market values and are interested in measuring the
pension contracts that link employees and taxpayers over time. The three
questions we pose typify the concerns of financial economists.
Value When Employment Ends. Employees acquire pension wealth in
accordance with the formulas embedded in their DB pension plans. When
employment ends, the vested plan participant owns an annuity whose value
reflects the probability that the recipient will be alive at each payment date,
including ancillary benefits that may entitle his beneficiary to receive payments after the former employee’s death. In the public sector, in contrast
to the private, it is common for future benefits to include post-employment
cost-of-living increases.
In practice, survival probabilities may be difficult to estimate and the
annuity might be hard to value for any given individual, but the law of large
numbers allows accurate estimates to be made for annuitant cohorts. The
asset pricing models favored by financial economists (e.g., the Capital Asset
Pricing Model) imply that the expected cohort cash flows may be valued
using rates of return on fixed income securities (the yield curve). Assuming
that pension default is unlikely, we can determine the value of benefits
that are not inflation protected using the Treasury yield curve, and the
value of inflation-indexed benefits using the Treasury Inflation-Protected
Securities (TIPS) curve. Practical concerns may refine these measures when
default is possible or when, as is frequently the case, inflation protection is
limited.
Nominal market rates are currently almost certainly no greater than 5
percent annually and real rates are below 2 percent. This is importantly
different from nominal rates used by public pension plan actuaries which
are, and have been for many years, in the neighborhood of 8 percent.
Value During the Employment Career. The pension wealth of an
employee still working clearly cannot be lower than the value of the benefit
promise assuming that the employee quits today. This ‘walk-away’ or exit
value is identified as the Vested Benefit Obligation (VBO) by private-sector
actuaries and accountants. A somewhat larger number is the Accumulated
Benefit Obligation (ABO) which augments the VBO by taking into account
the probability that an employee will become eligible for early retirement
subsidies or other ancillary rights that will increase the value of the benefits already earned. Neither the VBO nor the ABO attaches any value to
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benefits based on future service and future pay increases. A measure that
does take into account future salary (but not future service) is called the
Projected Benefit Obligation (PBO). All three measures take into account
plan-specified post-retirement cost-of-living increases when these are contractually ‘owned’ by the employee.
Consider a public sector employee who is eligible to retire immediately.
He/she is advised that if he/she retires today, he/she will receive an annuity
of $20,000 annually for life based on his/her current service and work
history. If he/she works another year, the benefit will be recomputed as,
say $22,000, giving him/her credit for an additional year of service and
for his/her then-higher salary. Note that he/she has no economic interest
in the benefit that might be calculated based upon today’s service and
tomorrow’s salary. That benefit would reflect a PBO value for pension
wealth today. The employee compares, instead, his/her accrued benefit
today (a $20,000 annuity beginning now) versus his/her accrued benefit
next year (a $22,000 annuity beginning then).
Because the ABO and the VBO are often close in value, we do not declare
one the preferred measure of pension wealth. We do, however, reject the
PBO as a pension wealth measure (Gold 2005).
What is the Value of the Benefit Earned Each Year? The present value of
accrued benefits at market rates may be followed from time t−1 to time t,
assuming that new benefits (ABt , with market value MVABt ) are earned
at year end and benefits (Pt ) are paid during the year:
MV L t−1 (1 + r̃ ) + MV ABt − Pt (1 + r̃ /2) = MV L t
where r̃ is the total liability rate of return.3 The MVABt may be computed
by the plan’s actuary who identifies the changes from t−1 to t in the
accrued benefits of active employees and discounts the associated cash
flows, applying the same yield curve used to develop MVLt from ABt . When
an actuary reports the MVL, we can estimate the MVABt as follows:4
MV ABt = MV L t − MV L t−1 (1 + r̃ ) + Pt (1 + r̃ /2)
The MVABt is an important economic datum, whether computed for the
retirement system or for individual employees. It is the pension wealth
newly acquired by today’s employees and it is properly viewed as the cost
incurred by today’s taxpayers.5
What is the Value of the Pension Promise to Taxpayers? Because the
plan owes what the participant holds as pension wealth, we can tentatively
conclude that the MVL is equal to the MVABO.6 But this measure has
not been widely accepted, with many actuaries arguing that the Actuarial
Accrued Liability (AAL, measured using expected rates of return on plan
assets) computed as part of the plan’s budgeting process is the best measure
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of plan liabilities. The Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB
1994a, 1994b) which governs reporting in this area agrees. In the private
sector, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB 1985) tells businesses to report the PBO as a balance sheet liability.
We defend the MVABO as the most economically relevant measure of
taxpayer obligations and compare it to the MVA to assess the financial
state of public DB plans. Let us consider arguments that the MVABO is too
high or too low a number. Some say MVABO is too high because it uses a
nearly risk-free discount rate, while the plan invests in risky assets expected
to exceed the risk-free rate over time. Those who make this argument
often accompany it with the assertion that the plan will be around for a
long time and is virtually certain to meet all of its obligations when due
(Almeida, Kenneally, and Madland 2009). In effect, this argument says
that riskless benefit promises funded by risky assets can be measured at
the expected rate of return on those risky assets. This arbitrage-defying
argument implicitly says that $100 worth of risky assets is more valuable
today than $100 worth of risk-free assets (Bader and Gold 2005). It fails
to account for the risk borne by future taxpayers who must make good
on the benefit promises even if the risky assets fail to perform (Gold
2003).
The MVL cannot be less than the MVABO, since public pensions are
subject to the ordinary rules of the financial markets and cannot magically
promise benefits below the value that the capital markets assign to similar,
default-free securities. Some contend that the MVABO is too low because
it fails to recognize future pay increases, strong (often state constitutionally
guaranteed) prohibitions of benefit reductions including benefits not yet
earned, and valuable options held by employees. As it is typically calculated,
the MVABO may underestimate the value of some options, but it also values
some options that are not yet vested such as the right to retire early and
receive a particularly valuable early retirement benefit. While these issues
can cut both ways, in concept the MVABO should include and properly
measure all options. With the caveat that the MVABO is imperfect, we
accept it as the best practical measure of the MVL for public pension
plans.
In the private sector, arguments are often made against recognizing
future pay increases in today’s benefit liabilities (Bodie 1990; Gold 2005;
Sohn 2006). The proposition is that benefits based on future pay increases
are not included, just as future pay increases are not. There is no current
obligation to pay more in the future than the economic value that the
employee will render in the future. In the public sector, this argument
can be challenged because benefits and pay are negotiated between agents
of the employees (union representatives) and of the taxpayers (elected
officials). In the private sector, a company that overpays its workers will not
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be able to compete for customers and capital. Forces that might make this
true in the public sector (where taxpayers consume services and provide
capital) are not obvious and may not exist.
Disclosure of the market value of benefit promises and the incremental
value associated with each year of employment (the MVAB) is a necessary
component in the development of negotiating discipline.
Summary: How Market Values Help Policymakers. To sum up, we have
argued future taxpayers will have to pay for future benefit promises as these
are earned, plus the MVL, less the MVA (i.e., Question 1 from above). If
the MVs are equal (i.e., the North Ratio is 100%), future taxpayers will
pay for future benefit accruals as these are earned; none of the services
they consume will be subsidized by earlier taxpayers nor will they be called
upon to pay for benefits already earned. Equality of MVL and MVA defines
a system that is fair to future taxpayers. If the plan is in deficit (MVA less
than MVL, North Ratio below 100%), taxpayers to date have underpaid; if
the plan is in surplus, the opposite is true.
We also have addressed how public plan funding levels and benefit
security can be compared across jurisdictions (i.e., Question 2 from above).
Specifically, a comparison of North Ratios will indicate which jurisdiction
has been better funded by current and prior taxpayers. A system with a
higher North Ratio has paid for more of its earned benefits than a system
with a lower ratio. Any system with a North Ratio greater than 100 percent
may be said to be protecting its participants and treating its future taxpayers
well. Although it is unlikely that taxpayers will choose their residences on
the basis of public plan financial status, areas with very low funding ratios
are likely to face higher taxes in the future. Information about future taxes
may affect home prices today.
And finally, the MVABt is the market value of benefits being earned by
public employees in year t (i.e., Question 3 from above). In recent years,
the combination of an aging workforce and low market discount rates (and
still high actuarial rates) implies that the MVABt is generally much higher
than the actuarially required contribution reported in actuarial reports
and CAFRs.

Estimating the market value of liabilities for public
pension plans
Despite the importance and usefulness of the MVL and MVAB measures,
these values are rarely calculated and almost never disclosed by public plans
in the United States. Decisionmakers with responsibility for plan activities,
including plan trustees, administrators, and elected officials, do not usually
ask their actuaries to calculate market values, and financial analysts working
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for rating agencies and bond investors do not have the necessary tools and
information to make independent assessments even if they were inclined
to do so. Part of the problem is that precise measurement of the MVL and
the MVAB can only be done by actuaries working with reliable plan data,
appropriate computer software, and detailed descriptions of the benefits
being earned.
In this section, we seek to estimate the MVLs for four arbitrarily selected
public pensions located in the Southeast (SE), Northwest (NW), Northeast
(NE) and Midwest (MW), using publicly-available information contained
in the CAFRs. Table 3-1 summarizes the relevant data extracted from the
four CAFRs.
We rely on the MVL information provided in the NYCERS CAFR to derive
a crude estimate of the value of benefits newly earned by its members,
namely, the MVAB. CAFRs commonly disclose the AAL. We make two
adjustments to convert the reported AAL into an estimated MVL. The first
adjustment from AAL to ABO (based on actuarial assumptions) requires
a change in accrual pattern. The second adjustment converts the ABO
to MVL; this requires a change to market observed discount and inflation rates.
The first adjustment requires converting the AAL to an ABO. Because
the ABO and AAL are identical for former employees, we need to adjust the
accrual pattern for active employees only. The majority of public pension
plans calculate the active AAL using the Entry Age Normal (EAN) actuarial
method.7 The EAN AAL equals the present value of future benefits (PVFB)
less the present value of future employer normal costs (PVFNC) less the
future employee contributions (PVFEC):8 AAL = PVFB − PVFNC where
present value is computed using the actuarial discount rate (expected rate
of return on plan assets).
Consider a 50-year-old employee who has worked for 20 years and is
expected to work an additional 10 years. Assuming a simple plan design
where the annual accrual is $1,000 (payable at retirement), this employee
would have accrued an annual benefit of $20,000 payable at age 60; the
projected annual pension at retirement will be $30,000. Typical actuarial
assumptions would value this annuity at $300,0009 at age 60. Discounting
this figure at 8 percent for 10 years, and assuming no pre-retirement decrements (mortality, early retirement, etc), the PVFB is $138,958.
Under the EAN method, normal cost is the level annual contribution at
entry (e.g., age 30) that will accumulate to the present value of $300,000 at
retirement. Level annual contributions of $2,648 accumulate with 8 percent
interest to $300,000 over 30 years. The present value of future normal
costs from now (age 50) until retirement (age 60) is $17,770.10 Plugging
these figures into the above formula yields: AAL = $138, 958 − $17, 770 =
$121, 188. Our 50-year old has accrued an annual benefit of $20,000
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Table 3-1 Summary of data from four public pension plans’ Comprehensive
Annual Financial Reports (CAFRs: $mm for aggregate financial
values)
Location of plana

NW

NE

MW

$58
55,534
55,386

$1,104
8,667
3,073

$1,794
5,676
4,160

$2,616
12,217
5,492

Total AAL
Actuarial asset value (AAV)
Funded ratio (AAV/AAL)
Market value of assets (MVA)

$110,978
$117,160
106%
$116,340

$12,844
$8,443
66%
$8,591

$11,630
$8,888
76%
$9,972

$20,325
$14,858
73%
$13,784

Active demographic data
Annual payroll
Number of actives (000)
Average annual salary (000)
Average age
Average service

$25,148
665
$38
44
10

$1,513
34
$45
45
9

$1,821
52
$35
n/a
n/a

$2,859
74
$39
n/a
n/a

60
CPI

60
CPI

Actuarial accrued liability (AAL)
Active member contributions
Retirees and beneficiaries
Active (employer portion)

Key plan provisions
Retirement ageb
Post-retirement COLAc

SE

59
3.00%

Key assumptions:
Investment return
Salary increased
Inflation assumption

7.75%
5.50%
n/a

8.25%
4.50%
3.50%

7.50%
5.50%
4.00%

60
1.5%
7.50%
4.50%
4.00%

a
Locations refer to Southeast (SE), Northwest (NW), Northeast (NE) and Midwest
(MW). Some retirement systems comprise several plans, making data collection and
judgment difficult.
b
The approximate age at which the full accrued benefit is payable as a life annuity has
a large impact on the factors used to convert the EAN AAL to an estimated ABO. The
retirement age drives the ‘years to retirement’ employed in Adjustment 1. The retirement
age differs markedly between different types of employees (e.g., uniformed, clerical,
teachers, administrators, etc.).
c
Cost of living adjustments after retirement. The consumer price index (CPI) may be
used as an automatic annual benefit increase factor. In the southeast, the plan specifies
an annual 3 percent increase independent of the CPI; in the mid west, the benefit is
increased by the lesser of 1.5 percent or the CPI; for all practical purposes this may be
treated as a straight 1.5 percent annual increase.
d
Our conversion factors are highly dependent on the assumed rate of salary increase.
Most plans assume greater salary increases at younger ages (when employee growth
contributes to individual productivity) and report a single compound growth rate which,
over an entire career, produces the same expected final salary. But our conversion looks
at mid to late career active employees whose future expected increases are smaller. In the
southeast, for example, we reduced the compound 6.25 percent to 5.5 percent based on
additional information contained in the CAFR.

Source: Authors’ computations, see text.
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ABO

Figure 3-1 Comparison of Entry Age Normal (EAN) liabilities to Accrued Benefit
Obligation (ABO) liabilities. Assumed salary scale: 0 percent. Note: Formula: 1
percent ∗ final salary ∗ years of service. Source: Authors’ computations; see text.

payable at age 60. Multiplying by our age 60 annuity factor and discounting
for 10 years at 8 percent, we calculate the actuarially valued ABO as
$92,639.
Figure 3-1 displays the EAN AAL and the ABO year by year from entry
age 30 until retirement at age 60. For our 50-year-old with 10 years left to
retirement, the ABO is estimated to be 76 percent (92,639/121,188) of the
EAN AAL. Table 3-2 provides sample conversion factors at various ages for
our (flat dollar) plan.11
Most public plans, however, compute pensions as a percentage of final
average pay. For such plans, the entry age normal cost is expressed as a percentage of each year’s pay. Table 3-3 calculates sample conversion factors
where the actuary has assumed a 5 percent salary increase at every age.12
For our 50-year-old, with 10 years left to retirement, the ABO is estimated to
be 54 percent (56,872/104,917) of the EAN AAL. We see (Table 3-4) that
conversion factors decrease as the salary assumption increases. Figure 3-2
displays the EAN AAL and the ABO year by year from entry age 30 until
retirement at age 60 with an assumed 5 percent salary increase.

17:33

29,813
43,805
64,364
69,514
75,075
81,081
87,567
94,573
102,138
110,309
119,134
128,665
138,958
150,075
162,081
175,047
189,051
204,175
220,509
238,150
257,202
277,778
300,000

PVFB
100,000
100,000
100,000
100,000
100,000
100,000
100,000
100,000
100,000
100,000
100,000
100,000
100,000
100,000
100,000
100,000
100,000
100,000
100,000
100,000
100,000
100,000
100,000

Salary
2,648
2,648
2,648
2,648
2,648
2,648
2,648
2,648
2,648
2,648
2,648
2,648
2,648
2,648
2,648
2,648
2,648
2,648
2,648
2,648
2,648
2,648
2,648

Normal
Cost
29,813
28,269
26,001
25,433
24,819
24,156
23,440
22,667
21,833
20,931
19,957
18,906
17,770
16,543
15,218
13,788
12,242
10,574
8,771
6,825
4,722
2,452
0

PVFNC
0
15,536
38,364
44,081
50,256
56,924
64,127
71,905
80,306
89,378
99,177
109,759
121,188
133,531
146,862
161,259
176,808
193,601
211,738
231,325
252,479
275,326
300,000

EAN Accrued
Actuarial Liability
0
5,000
10,000
11,000
12,000
13,000
14,000
15,000
16,000
17,000
18,000
19,000
20,000
21,000
22,000
23,000
24,000
25,000
26,000
27,000
28,000
29,000
30,000

Accrued Benefit
Payable at age 60
0
7,301
21,455
25,488
30,030
35,135
40,865
47,286
54,474
62,509
71,480
81,488
92,639
105,052
118,859
134,203
151,241
170,146
191,108
214,335
240,055
268,519
300,000

ABO

47
56
58
60
62
64
66
68
70
72
74
76
79
81
83
86
88
90
93
95
98
100

Conversion
Factor (%)

Mitchell-Main-drv
Mitchell
(Typeset by SPi, Chennai)
39 of 343

Notes: Formula: 1 percent ∗ final salary ∗ years of service. This table develops for one employee, hired at age 30, retired at age 60, benefits begin at
age 65, with salary increasing 5 percent annually throughout his career, the entry age normal liability accrual (EAN AAL) and the ABO. The ratio
(conversion factor) may be applied to a published EAN AAL to derive an ABO. To do so, however, for all the active employees in a plan, one must
judge how the range (30 to 60) should be modified and which row (age) is representative of the active employee population. If, for example, the full
range were deemed appropriate and the liability-weighted average employee were deemed to be age 53, the conversion factor would be 65 percent.
Source: Authors’ computations, see text.

30
35
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

Age

Table 3-2 Factors used to convert Entry Age Normal (EAN) Accrued Actuarial Liabilities (AAL) to Accumulated Benefit
Obligation (ABO). Assumed salary scale: 0 percent

978–0–19–957334–9
July 21, 2009
20:23

PVFB

29,813
43,805
64,364
69,514
75,075
81,081
87,567
94,573
102,138
110,309
119,134
128,665
138,958
150,075

162,081
175,047

30
35
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51

52
53

30,845
28,727

131,235
146,320

0
10,088
27,698
32,468
37,747
43,582
50,025
57,131
64,961
73,580
83,059
93,477
104,917
117,470

EAN Accrued
Actuarial Liability

14,890
16,346

0
1,477
3,769
4,353
4,986
5,672
6,414
7,215
8,081
9,015
10,023
11,109
12,278
13,537

Accrued Benefit
Payable at age 60

80,449
95,375

0
2,156
8,086
10,087
12,478
15,329
18,721
22,745
27,513
33,150
39,803
47,644
56,872
67,718

ABO

61
65

21
29
31
33
35
37
40
42
45
48
51
54
58

Conversion
Factor (%)
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4,368
4,586

29,813
33,717
36,666
37,046
37,328
37,499
37,542
37,442
37,178
36,730
36,075
35,188
34,041
32,605

PVFNC

(Typeset by SPi, Chennai)

67,684
71,068

1,493
1,906
2,432
2,554
2,681
2,815
2,956
3,104
3,259
3,422
3,593
3,773
3,962
4,160

Normal
Cost

Mitchell

23,138
29,530
37,689
39,573
41,552
43,630
45,811
48,102
50,507
53,032
55,684
58,468
61,391
64,461

Salary
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Table 3-3 Factors used to convert Entry Age Normal (EAN) liabilities to Accumulated Benefit Obligation (ABO) liabilities.
Assumed salary scale: 5 percent
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74,622
78,353
82,270
86,384
90,703
95,238
100,000

4,815
5,056
5,309
5,574
5,853
6,146
6,453

Notes: Formula: 1 percent ∗ final salary ∗ years of service.

189,051
204,175
220,509
238,150
257,202
277,778
300,000

26,210
23,250
19,802
15,811
11,223
5,975
0

162,841
180,925
200,707
222,338
245,979
271,803
300,000

17,909
19,588
21,390
23,324
25,397
27,619
30,000

112,858
133,314
157,225
185,150
217,737
255,732
300,000

69
74
78
83
89
94
100

Mitchell-Main-drv

This table develops for one employee, hired at age 30, retired at age 60, benefits begin at age 65, with salary increasing 5 percent annually
throughout his career, the entry age normal liability accrual (EAN AAL) and the ABO. The ratio (conversion factor) may be applied to a
published EAN AAL to derive an ABO. To do so, however, for all the active employees in a plan, one must judge how the range (30 to 60)
should be modified and which row (age) is representative of the active employee population. If, for example, the full range were deemed
appropriate and the liability-weighted average employee were deemed to be age 53, the conversion factor would be 65 percent.
Source: Authors’ computations, see text.
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Figure 3-2 Comparison of Entry Age Normal (EAN) liabilities to Accrued Benefit
Obligation (ABO) liabilities. Assumed salary scale: 5 percent. Note: Formula: 1
percent ∗ final salary ∗ years of service. Source: Authors’ computations; see text.

Based on the data in Table 3-1 and the factors in Table 3-4, the analyst
uses judgment and experience to choose a conversion factor. Although
many considerations could influence the choice of a conversion factor, the
most important is the number of years left until retirement. We estimate
the liability-weighted average number of years to retirement after reviewing
each of our four plan provisions, actuarial assumptions, and summary
member data disclosed in the respective CAFRs. Applying this approach
to our four public plans we develop the relationship of the AAL to the
ABO shown in Table 3-5. Although the NE plan’s CAFR did not provide an
average age (an important element in our estimate of years to retirement),
it did disclose an ABO-like value in accordance with FAS No. 35 (FASB
1980). For the other three plans, we assume a 65 percent conversion factor.
If the plan provisions and demographics in combination with the actuarial
assumptions differ significantly from the four samples provided here, the
conversion factor will be different.13
The second adjustment converts the ABO to the MVL. Latter (2007)
reports that the average actuarial discount rate for the two largest plans
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Table 3-4 Converting Entry Age Normal (EAN) liabilities to
Accumulated Benefit Obligation (ABO) liabilities:
various salary assumptions
Years to Ret Age

Salary Scale Assumption (%)
4.50
5.00

0
25
20
15
10
5
0

47
56
66
76
88
100

23
31
42
56
75
100

21
29
40
54
74
100

5.50
20
28
38
53
73
100

Notes: Formula: 1 percent ∗ final salary ∗ years of service. Conversion
factors are shown based on years to retirement and various assumed salary
increases. Factors based on 5 percent (bold) come from Table 3-3.
Source: Authors’ computations, see text.

in each of the 50 United States is 8 percent. Figure 3-3 shows that this
assumed return is significantly higher than the Treasury spot curve at
March 31, 2008.
Actuaries who perform valuations for public plans can readily develop
the cash flows that underlie the ABO. Because these underlying cash flows
are not presented in CAFRs, we rely on a hypothetical set of cash flows
that approximate the ABO term structure for large public plans—ignoring
post-retirement increases for cost of living. We adjust these cash flows for
cost-of-living provisions and then value them twice: using the plan actuary’s
assumptions, and market assumptions. The ratio of these values for the
hypothetical population is then applied to the ABOs developed in the first
adjustment. For technical reasons, we make these calculations separately
for retired and active populations.
Table 3-5 First adjustment: converting the Actuarial Accrued Liability (AAL) to
Accumulated Benefit Obligation (ABO)
Location of plan
1. Active AAL
2. Conversion factor
3. Active ABO [(1)∗ (2)]
4. Retired and beneficiaries
Total ABO [(3)+(4)]

SE
$55,444
65%
$36,039
55,534
$91,574

NW
$4,177
65%
$2,715
8,667
$11,383

NE
$5,954
n/a
$3,873
5,676
$9,549

MW
$8,108
65%
$5,270
12,217
$17,488

Notes: See Table 3-1. Factor of 65 percent based on Table 3-4 with about seven liabilityweighted years to retirement.
Source: Authors’ computations, see text.
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Figure 3-3 Nominal interest rates: actuarial versus market. Source: Authors’ computations; see text.

The SE plan specifies that benefits will increase 3 percent annually after
retirement regardless of the actual inflation rate. The actuarial valuation
already embeds these increases and we need only adjust for the difference
between the nominal actuarial discount rate (7.75%) and the Treasury
spot curve. As shown in Table 3-6, our hypothetical population liabilities
increase by factors of 1.3366 (retirees) and 1.9506 (actives). We apply these
to the retiree and active ABOs brought forward from Table 3-5 to estimate
an MVL of $144,528 million.
The MW plan provides post-retirement benefit increases equal to the
lesser of CPI and 1.5 percent. In theory, a capped CPI formula requires an
option model. This would be especially true if the cap were, say, 4 percent
and would be likely to apply in some years and not in others. As a practical
matter, the 1.5 percent cap is likely to apply in every year and thus we
proceed as if the MW plan, like the SE plan, specified a fixed benefit
increase rate. We use our hypothetical population to derive factors of
1.3142 (retirees) and 1.8613 (actives). Our MVL is estimated to be $25,864
million.
Because many public plans provide a cost-of-living adjustment (COLA),
we need to adjust for the difference between actuarial and market real
returns. Latter (2007) reports that the average inflation assumption for
the two largest plans in each of the 50 United States is 3.5 percent.
Figure 3-4 shows that this average assumed real return of 4.35 percent
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Table 3-6 Second adjustment: converting the Accumulated Benefit Obligation
(ABO) to a Market Value Liability (MVL)
Location of plan
Plan economic assumptions
Nominal discount rate
Inflation (COLA)
assumption
Real discount rate

SE
7.75%
n/a
n/a

NW

NE

8.25%

7.50%

3.50%
4.59%

4.00%
3.37%

MW
7.50%
n/a
n/a

PV of hypothetical plan Retirees:
1. Plan nominal discount rate $72,200
$69,834
$73,435
$73,435
2. Treasury yield curve
96,505
96,505
96,505
96,505
3. Plan real discount rate
#N/A
90,936
100,444
#N/A
4. TIPS yield curve
119,568
119,568
119,568
119,568
5. Adjustment factor
(2/1 or 4/3)
1.3366
1.3149
1.1904
1.3142
PV of hypothetical plan Actives:
1. Plan nominal discount rate $86,008
2. Treasury yield curve
167,770
3. Plan real discount rate
#N/A
4. TIPS yield curve
266,675
5. Adjustment factor
(2/1 or 4/3)
1.9506
Conversion of ABO to MVL
1. Retiree ABO
2. Adjustment factor
3. Retiree MVL [(1)∗ (2)]
4. Active ABO
5. Adjustment factor
6. Active MVL [(4)∗ (5)]
7. Total MVL [(3)+(6)]

$78,447
167,770
127,657
266,675
2.0890

$90,135
167,770
162,672
266,675
1.6393

$90,135
167,770
#N/A
266,675
1.8613

$55,534
$8,667
$5,676
$12,217
1.3366
1.3149
1.1904
1.3142
74,229
11,396
6,757
16,055
36,039
2,715
3,873
5,270
1.9506
2.0890
1.6393
1.8613
70,299
5,672
6,349
9,809
$144,528
$17,067
$13,106
$25,864

Note: See Table 3-1.
Source: Authors’ computations, see text.

(1.08/1.035 – 1) is significantly higher than the TIPS spot curve at March
31, 2008. Figure 3-5 compares the Treasury Spot curve (from Figure 3-3) to
the TIPS curve (from Figure 3-4) as of March 31, 2008. The inflation curve
represents the difference between these two curves.
The NW and NE plans provide for full CPI indexing after retirement.
Table 3-6 shows assumed nominal discount rates of 8.25 percent and 7.5
percent and inflation rates of 3.5 percent and 4 percent for these plans.
We use our hypothetical populations to estimate the impact of replacing
these actuarial assumptions with market rates of discount and inflation.
Benefits that will grow at the full CPI may be estimated by discounting noninflated cash flows using real rates of return. We compute the values of
the retiree cash flows by discounting at the actuarially assumed real rates
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Figure 3-4 Real interest rates: actuarial versus market. Source: Authors’ computations; see text.
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Figure 3-5 Treasury interest rates, real and break-even inflation rates (as of
3/31/2008). Source: Authors’ computations; see text.
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Table 3-7 Comparison of funded status: Actuarial vs. Market
Location of plan
Actuarial Accrued Liability (AAL)
Actuarial Asset Value (AAV)
Funded status
Market Value of Liability (MVL)
Market Value of Assets (MVA)
Funded status

SE
110,978
117,160
106%
144,528
116,340
80%

NW
12,844
8,443
66%
17,067
8,591
50%

NE
11,630
8,888
76%
13,106
9,972
76%

MW
20,325
14,858
73%
25,864
13,784
53%

Note: See Table 3-1.
Source: Authors’ computations, see text.

(4.59% for the NW and 3.37% for the NE) and then repeat the calculation
using the market’s real rates found in the TIPs curve. We take the ratio
of the market value to the actuarial values (119,568/90,936 = 1.3149 and
119,568/100,444 = 1.1904 respectively) and, in the last panel of Table 3-6,
we apply these to the retiree ABOs determined in the first adjustment.
For active lives, the ABO benefits are indexed only after the employee
retires. During the period between now and benefit commencement, we
need to discount benefits at nominal rates. Real rates are used thereafter.
This calculation leads to multipliers for the active members of the NW and
NE plans of 2.0890 and 1.6393, respectively. The multipliers are higher
for actives than for retirees primarily because the benefits will be paid for
longer periods, thereby growing more with inflation. For both actives and
retirees, the NW plan multipliers are higher than those for the NE because
the NE actuary has been much more conservative (and thus closer to the
market).
In the final panel of Table 3-6, we apply all of our respective multipliers
to the active and retired lives ABOs determined by the first adjustment
producing our final estimate of MVL on line 7. Table 3-7 compares the
actuarial funded status to our crude mark to market funded status. In
this market environment (Figures 3-3 and 3-4), one would anticipate lower
market funded ratios after applying the adjustments. Indeed, in three cases
(SE, NW, and MW) the market funded status is lower than the actuarial
funded status. The funded status for the NE plan is unchanged since the
actuarial economic assumptions are relatively conservative and the MVA is
higher than the AAV.
MV ABt = MV L t − MV L t−1 (1 + r̃ ) + Pt (1 + r̃ /2)
and applying it to the detailed MVL information provided in the NYCERS
CAFR, we can now obtain a rough estimate of the benefits newly earned by
its members, or the MVAB. At time t-1, the market value, duration, and
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implied market interest rate are $55.4 billion, 12.7 years, and 4.2 percent,
respectively. At time t, the market value, duration and implied market
interest rate are $49.8 billion, 11.7 years and 5.4 percent, respectively. From
the CAFR we see the annual pension payments are $3.0 billion. From this
information we estimate a liability return (r̃ ) of −9.5 percent. Plugging
these figures into our formula results in ($bn):
MVAB = 49.8–55.4 ∗ (1 − .095) + 3.0 ∗ (1 − .095/2) = 2.5

Discussion
Many in the public plan community argue that differences between the
private (corporate) sector and the public sector are sufficient to exempt
public plans from the market discipline that constrains corporate plans.
This view has been also espoused by the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB 2006) which contrasts the valuation (and investor)
focus of private sector accounting with the accountability (for the use of
resources) focus applicable to public financial reporting. This and other
distinctions justify financial reporting in the public sector different from
that in private enterprise. When it comes to pensions, GASB (2006: 8) says:
The longer term view of operations of government is consistent with focusing on
trends in operations, rather than on short-term fluctuations, such as in fair values
of certain assets and liabilities. Immediate recognition of changes in fair values of
assets set aside in employee benefit plans is appropriate accountability reporting in
the employee benefit plans that hold those assets. However, it is not appropriate
for government employers to immediately recognize those fair value changes or
changes in accrued actuarial liabilities resulting from a change in benefit plan
terms. These short-term fluctuations could produce a measurement of the period’s
employee benefit costs, which are included in cost of services, that may be less
decision-useful for governmental financial report users.

We respect the distinction between valuation and accountability between
the private and public sectors, but we disagree with how this difference
is applied to public pension plans. The conclusion—that recognition of
the value of changes in benefit terms is less decision-useful—is not supported by distinctions between private and public accounting objectives.
The decision to modify plan terms cannot be well made in the absence of
market values for the very benefit changes being considered. Some in the
public plan community use the GASB’s lack of recognition requirement to
justify non-disclosure of MVL, annual MVAB, and MVAB attributable
to plan amendments. While we agree that governments are not the same
as corporations, we nonetheless view a public DB plan as a financial institution. In this sense, it has more in common with insurance companies
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and private sector pension plans than with either a government or a
corporation.
Insurance companies and DB plans make long-term promises in
exchange for current cash. The long-term ‘reservoir’ aspect of these institutions implies that they have high ratios of assets on hand to benefits
currently being paid. Many opponents of market disclosure for public plans
use the long-term nature of the commitments to justify discounting future
promises using the expected return on plan assets. Their long-term nature
is also used to justify the amortization of liabilities created instantly (upon
plan amendment) over long periods (usually as a constant percentage of
payrolls assumed to rise perpetually). We believe that ignorance of the
market values of current liabilities and reporting that defers recognition of
significant increases in current liabilities attributable to plan amendments
is no more justified for a government-sponsored DB plan, than it is for
a corporate DB plan, than it is for an insurance company. The different
nature of the sponsor does not port down to the plan nor does it reduce
the decision-usefulness of market values (Gold 2003).
In recent years, many public plan actuaries have argued that the longterm nature of public pension plans allows risk-sharing across generations
with benefits for all. This argument does not survive serious scrutiny. Especially suspect is the argument that returns from risky investing can be frontloaded for the benefit of today’s taxpayers and public employees, without
injury to future generations of taxpayers. If future taxpayers bear all the
risks, why are they not entitled to all the rewards? If the current generation
gets rewards without risks, should future taxpayers settle for rewards that
are below those available to other market participants exposed to the same
risks? Indeed, unfunded benefits conferred on today’s employees come at
the expense of tomorrow’s taxpayers (Bader and Gold 2003).
We note that Cui, de Jong, and Ponds (2007) argue that risk-sharing
across generations, although it cannot add value, can enhance generational
welfare (utility). That analysis postulates fairly valued trades (intergenerational commitment contracts) between generations implemented by adjustment technologies that can be modeled as the trading of contingent claims
across generations. Gains and losses on risky investments incurred by one
generation can then be passed on to future generations in accordance with
these commitments. History, however, suggests that each current generation tends to be more willing to pass on losses than gains, raising serious
governance questions that remain to be addressed.
Actuarial opponents of the application of market economics to public plans argue that the MVL reflects a ‘termination’ concept, while the
ongoing nature of public plans renders the MVL irrelevant. A distinction
between corporate and public plans, they say, is that corporate plans terminate so the MVL measures an improbable event in the public sector.
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We counter that the MVL measures accrued pension wealth (independent
of plan termination), a standard concept in labor economics. Similarly, the
MVAB measures changes in pension wealth, an important component of
total employee compensation.
It is frequently argued that the MVL cannot be measured as well for
public plans as for private sector plans, because the employment contracts
are different. We acknowledge these contractual differences but note that
failing to measure the MVL makes it difficult to make good decisions
about public sector employment contracts and total compensation. The
lack of information about market values leads to many of the very contract
provisions that are then cited as the reason why market value cannot be
reliably measured. Unfortunately, societal interests are not well served by
such circular reasoning and argument.
Threats to the Existence of Public Pension Plans. Agents in the public
pension arena argue that the disclosure of market-based information about
plan liabilities might be used by opponents of DB plans to terminate these
arrangements. As evidenced by proposals in California14 and elsewhere,
some in the political arena do oppose public DB plans, and they are likely
to use information that reveals the financial cost and volatility of riskily
invested DB plans in their efforts. Such opponents generally advocate
defined contribution (DC) plans because such plans have a more certain,
and usually lower, cost than current DB pensions. They also point to the
private sector, saying that elements of FAS No. 87 reporting have led the corporate sector astray. Thus, the argument goes, reporting MVL will threaten
the existence of public DB plans.
We agree that DC plans are less able than DB plans to provide lifetime
income to retired civil service employees. Nonetheless, we argue that DB
plans will be strengthened by pertinent market value information. In the
financial security arena, market values are key to rational decisionmaking.
Particularly under today’s economic conditions, traditional actuarial methods and assumptions tend to understate the cost of DB plans. Under all economic conditions they understate the volatility. In the period from 1975–85,
however, these same methods and assumptions substantially overstated benefit values and cost. Decisions should not be driven by the position that
overstating costs for a decade or more may be balanced by understatement
for some other period.
The lesson that should be taken from the MVL and MVAB is that it costs
more to provide a given level of retirement income in times of low interest
rates (real and nominal, as appropriate) than it does in times of high rates.
A system supported by honest reporting of market values would recognize
that more of today’s total compensation needs to be set aside in low interest
rate periods. While the converse, that less needs to be set aside when rates
are high, may seem to be a welcome message when applicable, the bottom
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line is that more of today’s total compensation needs to be deferred if DB
pension promises are to be paid for by those consuming the services today.
Those who favor DC plans seek to set aside smaller amounts in a fashion
that is less risky to government employers (and thus future taxpayers),
even if those plans eventually prove to be inadequate to protect retirees.
It is critical to acknowledge that good pensions are more costly today than
they were in the early 1980s. That is, pension funding must rise; risky
investments do not produce free lunches (future taxpayers bear the risk);
and benefits may have to be less generous than they have been to date.
The pressure on DB plans is not a by-product of additional measurement
and reporting. No economic sector can escape the hard rules of the capital
markets. Trends around the world make this more true today than ever
before. Alternatives to wasteful deployment of resources arise everywhere.
The public plan sector with an estimated $3 trillion in assets and perhaps as much as $4 trillion in MVL is no exception. The economics that
rules the other roughly $120 trillion of capital assets and financial institutions will prevail in the public pension arena.15 Ignoring the market
realities and hoping for the best might, in the short run, prolong the life
of plans that may (in today’s interest rate environment) be more generous
than affordable. But those who wish to perpetuate and enjoy the benefits
of DB pension plans should welcome the disclosure of these important
numbers as part of a sustainable long term strategy.
Full identification and recognition of MVABs (combined with MVAs
and MVLs that reveal existing funding shortfalls) might come as a shock
to the system if released in today’s interest rate environment. The consequences will not occur at one moment in time, however, and some
adjustment period will be necessary (perhaps more than a decade). But
the first response should be that pressure is increased on state and local
governments to get their fiscal houses in order. This additional information
should make it easier for elected officials to negotiate future total compensation that is more affordable and sustainable. Employees will be able to
compare funding levels and benefit security between their plan and those
in other jurisdictions. Employees with better funded plans can anticipate
less pressure on their future benefits and wages than employees with poorly
funded plans.
Pushback by Privately-Employed Taxpayers. Since 1950, public employment in the United States has grown relative to the private sector, and public sector workers’ importance as voters has grown as well. This voting power
is used skillfully by those who negotiate wages and benefits on their behalf,
and it has become easy and routine for elected officials to grant benefit
improvements especially when the costs are systematically understated. As a
result, public employees today enjoy generally better pension benefits than
their private sector counterparts, and the disparity is increasing even as,

20:23

978–0–19–957334–9

Mitchell-Main-drv

Mitchell

(Typeset by SPi, Chennai)

52 of 343

July 21, 2009

52 Jeremy Gold and Gordon Latter

in many areas, public employees’ wages are catching or have caught up to
private wages of those in similar positions (Brainard 2009; Clark, Craig, and
Ahmed 2009). Many private-sector employees now have jobs comparable to
those held by public employees (e.g., office workers, private carters, private
school teachers).
Disclosure of the annual equivalent compensation cost (MVAB) will
facilitate comparison of total compensation between sectors, and it may
exert some countervailing pressure on public officials and strengthen
the hand of those who represent taxpayers. Accordingly, the additional
information we recommend may lead to better decisionmaking and a new
balance of interests between taxpayers and public employees.
Quality of Estimates. The estimation process described above adjusted
first, for the pattern of accrual (AAL → ABO), and second, for the difference between actuarial assumptions and market observations of discount
and inflation rates (ABO → MVL). Each of these adjustments depends
on many moving parts, and the standard CAFR actuarial disclosures are
not designed to facilitate such re-estimation. It is possible that our MVL
estimates might be off as much as 20 percent, which is not a trivial matter.
The most uncertain part of our process is the estimation of the AAL/ABO
relationships illustrated in Figures 3-1 and 3-2 and the selection of the
number of years to retirement which we use to choose our conversion
factor (Table 3-4). We are more confident about the second adjustment
where we are less dependent on the behind-the-curtain actuarial machinery. Despite our concerns over the reliability of our estimates, we believe
that our analysis is likely to be more accurate than financial analyses
that rely on, rather than penetrate, the dynamics of traditional actuarial
methods.
Interest Rate Sensitivity. Economists often look at partial derivatives of
decision measures to assess the impact of small changes in the inputs
used to compute those measures. Actuaries often do a similar analysis
that they call sensitivity testing. Interest rates are frequently the subject
of such analyses. The funding ratios measured using common actuarial
methods and assumptions look very stable. In the extreme case—aggregate
funding—the funding ratio is always 100 percent. Funding ratios measured
at market can be quite volatile, primarily because of asset/liability mismatches. Despite some caveats about the accuracy of our estimates, we are
confident that our measures will be relatively robust. If, for example, TIPS
rates change and we estimate retiree liabilities for a fully indexed plan, the
re-estimated retiree MVL will be consistent and sensitivity will be reflected
properly.
Market Value of Benefits Earned. For the year ended June 30, 2006,
employers participating in NYCERS and its employees contributed less than
$1.4 billion to that plan. Because the plan’s AAL is virtually identical to
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its AAV, no contributions are made with respect to unfunded past service
costs and the entire $1.4 billion represents normal cost. In the same fiscal
year, we have estimated the MVAB to be $2.5 billion. This is the value
of future benefits newly acquired by active employees and it represents
the normal cost using the traditional unit credit actuarial cost method
combined with market rates of discount. In fiscal 2006, therefore, New
York City contributed substantially less to the plan than the new pension
wealth acquired by its employees. Accordingly, our approach implies that
approximately $1 billion in value received by today’s employees will be paid
by future taxpayers. As of June 30, 2006, the NYCERS plan MVA and MVL
were $37.3 billion and $49.8 billion respectively, representing a market
deficit of $12.5 billion. None of this deficit is recognized in cost calculations
under the traditional actuarial methods, and all of it, plus interest, will have
to be paid for by future taxpayers. Future taxpayers are on the hook for
both the existing $12.5 billion shortfall and the newly added $1 billion,
and must pay either in cash or by taking uncompensated market risk (Gold
2003).

Conclusion
The market value of DB public pension plan liabilities, in conjunction
with the available market value of plan assets, are measures that have the
potential to shine light in an arena where employees, taxpayers, and lenders
have not had access to the information needed to make independent
assessments. To our knowledge, only the New York City plan actuary makes
these computations and discloses the results to date. We propose that all
public pension actuaries make these additional disclosures using reliable
plan data, appropriate computer software, and detailed descriptions of the
benefits being earned.
To illustrate this point, we arbitrarily selected four public plans to make
the adjustments necessary to convert the disclosed budget liability or AAL
into an estimated MVL. Our adjustments are rough, but they produce
a much lower market funded status (versus actuarial) for three plans.
Nonetheless, most public sector DB plans today report in accordance with
GASB Nos. 25 and 27 (GASB 1994a, 1994b). A GASB white paper (GASB
2006) discusses the distinction between accounting for private enterprises
(where the emphasis is on financial valuation) and accounting for public
sector activities (where the emphasis is accountability and the husbandry of
scarce resources). Although this distinction is important and appropriate,
we believe that the actuarial values disclosed in accordance with GASB Nos.
25 and 27 do not serve accountability as well as they would if they were to
include the MVL and the MVAB.
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Advocates of the status quo argue that the MVL is a concept that appears
in private sector accounting (the ABO defined by FAS No. 87) because
private plans can terminate, whereas they assert that public plans have an
‘infinite horizon.’16 This misses the more general economic importance
of the MVL as a measure of wealth held by employees and owed by taxpayers. It is this property of the MVL that makes it appropriate to all DB
plans, to decision making about these plans, and to answering the three
questions raised herein. Other status quo advocates contend that marketbased calculations inject spurious volatility into funding ratios and plan
costs. The volatility, however, is real. The cost of providing benefits when
market interest rates are 4 percent is significantly greater than when rates
are 12 percent.
This chapter advocates the calculation and disclosure of the market
value of liabilities (MVL) and the annual equivalent compensation cost
(MVAB) for public sector pension plans. Market-based information is
critically important input for those who wish to make fiscally responsible
decisions.

Notes
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Some have suggested that using a relevant swap curve instead of Treasury rates
provides a better market measure of the liability. We take an agnostic view with
respect to the technical advantages of one or the other measure and accept either
as a useful way to estimate MVL.
The theme has been carried forward by D’Arcy (1989) and Hardy (2005) and,
into the pension arena, by Exley, Mehta, and Smith (1997), Bader and Gold
(2003), and Enderle et al. (2006).
Liability returns are computed analogously to asset returns (Leibowitz 1987)
reflecting both the passage of time and changes in the beginning and ending
discount rate curves.
This is the Traditional Unit Credit (TUC) Normal Cost computed at market rates.
Actuaries, elected officials, and other agents usually assert that the ‘cost’ of
the plan is equal to the actuarially required contributions. Economists, and the
markets they defer to, disagree.
Earlier we used the term ABO to define the recognized accrual pattern (i.e., a
liability that does not anticipate future service or pay increases). Henceforth, we
use the term ABO to mean the value of such accrued benefits when discounted
using the plan’s actuarial assumptions. We use MVABO to mean the value discounted using market rates.
Some states and localities (e.g., New York State) use the aggregate actuarial
funding method to determine an annual contribution. Under this method the
AAL is set equal to the actuarial value of plan assets (leading to the meaningless
tautology that the plan is always fully funded). Attempting to estimate an EAN
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8

9

10
11

12

13

14

15

16

AAL from the aggregate figures would require more in-depth analysis. Fortunately, GASB (2007) requires disclosure of the EAN AAL for all plans using the
aggregate funding method.
Although most public pension plans require employee contributions, we set the
PVFEC to zero to simplify the exposition. This affects the sharing of cost between
the employer and the employees but does not change the AAL.
Using the RP2000 Combined Healthy Male mortality table and an assumed interest rate of 8 percent the non-indexed single life annuity value at age 60 equals
9.9238. We round to 10.0 to simplify the exercise: $300, 000 = $30, 000∗ 10.0.
This equals $2,648 ∗ 10-year annuity at 8 percent.
The benefit payable at 60 under this plan is the same as under a plan specifying
1 percent of final salary for each year of service where the final pay is $100,000
(i.e., 1%∗ 100, 000∗ 30 = $30, 000).
The model was built to produce the same $30,000 pension, irrespective of salary
increase assumption.
In most jurisdictions separate plans are established for uniformed (or safety)
employees. Such plans provide for much lower retirement ages. A common
provision allows retirement at any age after 20 or 25 years of service. Many police
and firefighters retire in their mid 40s.
This refers to a 2005 California proposal reported by Delsey and Hill (2005),
later dropped by Gov. Schwarzenegger (Gledhill 2005).
The latest US only figure from the Federal Flow of Funds was $61.984 trillion
(Federal Reserve Board 2007). Non-US figures are assumed to be at least as great
as the US figure.
See Findlay (2008). But Revell (2008) reports an instance of a governmental plan
sponsor declaring bankruptcy, citing unaffordable pension and health care costs
for its employees. The seeming permanence of public plans is often cited as a
reason to discount liabilities at rates reflecting expected returns on risky assets,
but Kohn (2008) proposes that low-risk liabilities must be discounted with lowrisk discount rates.
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